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CRIME, GUN CONTROL, AND THE BATF:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Jim F. Couch*
and William F Shughart I**
INTRODUCTION
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF"), an
agency of the United States Treasury Department, has wide-rang-
ing law enforcement responsibilities, which include the investiga-
tion of crimes involving guns, explosives, and illicit drugs.' Its
execution of these duties has been the subject of considerable con-
troversy.2 The Bureau's participation in incidents at Ruby Ridge,
Idaho, and Waco, Texas, resulting in over one hundred deaths (in-
cluding that of one federal agent), triggered serious questioning of
the competence of the BATF's leadership,3 as well as its methodol-
ogy for establishing law enforcement priorities.4
The latter issue has been a longstanding point of contention be-
tween the BATF and its critics. According to United States Repre-
sentative John H. Dingell (D-MI), for example, "The goal of the
agency appears to be less the prosecution of criminals and persons
unlawfully engaged in the illegal use of firearms than in the manu-
* Professor, Department of Economics, Finance and Quantitative Studies, Uni-
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** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Mississippi. The Authors
are grateful to Bernie Hoerr, Director of Membership Programs, National Rifle Asso-
ciation, for granting access to the NRA membership data on which this Study analysis
is based. John Lott and Hilary Shughart provided useful comments on an earlier ver-
sion of this Essay; J. G. Chen supplied able research assistance. As is customary,
however, the Authors accept full responsibility for any errors.
1. Dismantling of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 3 (1981).
2. See David B. Kopel & Paul H. Blackman, No More Wacos: What's Wrong with
Federal Law Enforcement and How to Fix It 292-310 (1997).
3. Polemicists have characterized the BATF as a "rogue agency." See, e.g.,
WAYNE LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME, AND FREEDOM 177-79 (1994). As long ago as
1980, even public officials otherwise strongly supportive of expansive governmental
authority have disparaged the bureau's methods: "If I were to select a jack-booted
group of fascists who were perhaps as large a danger to American society as I could
pick today, I would pick the BATF. They are a shame and a disgrace to our country."
Id. at 177 (quoting Congressman John H. Dingell).
4. Id. at 177-200 (supplying details about the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents in a
chapter entitled "BATF Abuses").
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facturing of a statistical record of persons who have committed
some technical violation of the 1968 Gun Control Act."5 A Febru-
ary 1982 report of the Senate Judiciary Committee similarly con-
cluded, "approximately 75 percent of BATF gun prosecutions were
aimed at ordinary citizens who had neither criminal intent nor
knowledge, but were enticed by agents into unknowing technical
violations."'6 Wayne LaPierre summarizes these criticisms in the
following terms: "Charged with enforcing federal gun control laws,
federal agents persecute and entrap citizens who have done noth-
ing wrong and would never contemplate doing anything wrong."'
This Study explores whether conclusive evidence exists to prove
that the BATF systematically harasses responsible gun owners. Us-
ing cross-sectional data from the fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia for the year 1995, this Study finds, other things equal,
BATF agents tend to refer more cases for criminal prosecution to
United States Attorneys in states where more citizens belong to
the National Rifle Association ("NRA").8 Evidence that violent
crime rates are lower in states with large numbers of NRA mem-
bers tends to prove this positive relationship between criminal re-
ferrals and NRA membership signifies harassment, rather than
cost-effectiveness, in the allocation of scarce law enforcement re-
sources. Moreover, U.S. Attorneys tend to decline to prosecute
more of the cases referred to them by BATF agents in high NRA
membership states.9
This Study also sheds light on the non-existent impact of various
state gun control laws on violent crime rates, and on the crime-
deterring potential of laws allowing private citizens to carry hand-
guns concealed about their persons. Consistent with the work of
Lott and Lott and Mustard, violent crime rates are significantly
lower in states where, under general conditions, local police offi-
cials "shall issue" concealed-carry permits to adults, 10 except those
with prior criminal records or histories of mental illness." The
5. Id.; see KOPEL & BLACKMAN, supra note 2, at 305.
6. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 23 (1982).
7. LAPIERRE, supra note 3, at 178.
8. See discussion infra Part II, Conclusion, & App.
9. See discussion infra Part II, Conclusion, & App.
10. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME
AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS 50-96 (1998); see also John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mus-
tard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Weapons, 26 J. LEGAL STUD-
IES 1, 18-26 (1.997).
11. Federal law prohibits the sale of firearms to these classes. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(d) (2000).
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chief contribution of this Study, though, is to add a new dimension
to interest-group theories of regulation, namely that regulatory
agencies like the BATF may use their discretionary law enforce-
ment authority selectively, not only to channel benefits to special-
interest groups in return for political support, l2 but also to quash
dissent by harassing members of organizations that oppose the
agency's mandate, or are critical of its methods.
Part I of this Study explores some of the historical background
and institutional details surrounding the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms. Part II presents the data and empirical results
used in and stemming out of this Essay's statistical study. Finally,
this Study ends with some concluding remarks.
I. A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE BATF
Because of its unique history, the mandate of the Bureau of Al-
cohol, Tobacco, and Firearms covers a broad range of seemingly
unrelated law enforcement responsibilities. 13 The agency's activi-
ties run the gamut from revenue collection to crime prevention; it
pursues rumrunners, cigarette smugglers, and international
terrorists. 14
Federal excise taxes have been levied on distilled spirits since the
Republic's earliest days, being greeted occasionally by opposi-
tion.'5 For example, dissent amongst farmers in western Penn-
sylvania, for whom it was cheaper to transport liquor than raw
grain to markets in the east, erupted into the famous Whiskey Re-
bellion of 1794. Due to this unpopularity, the federal government
needed an enforcement mechanism to ensure taxpayer compli-
ance. 6 A small group of agents comprising the Internal Revenue
Service's ("IRS") Alcohol Tax Unit ("ATU") performed these du-
ties until the onset of Prohibition.' 7
12. See ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLA-
TIONS, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GRouP THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT 7-12 (1981) (correlating enforcement activity with house sizes, legisla-
tive size, wealth, and population); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213-31 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3-6 (1971).
13. WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, IN THE CROSS FIRE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS 1-16 (1997).
14. Id.
15. Brenda Yelvington, Excise Taxes in Historical Perspective, in TAXING CHOICE:
THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 31, 32-33 (William F.
Shughart II ed., 1997).
16. Id. at 33-34.
17. VIZZARD, supra note 13, at 2.
20031 619
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Franklin Delano Roosevelt campaigned for the presidency in
1932 on a platform calling for the repeal of Prohibition. 18 His sup-
port for reverting to a policy of legal alcohol sales was based in
large part on a desire to replace the income tax revenue lost to the
sharp decline in economic activity following the stock market crash
of 1929.19 Shortly after Prohibition ended in 1933, the Federal Al-
cohol Administration Act established license and permit require-
ments for liquor retailers.2" The responsibility for enforcing this
legislation was delegated to the Federal Alcohol Administration,
which was housed administratively within the Treasury Depart-
ment.2" The Federal Alcohol Administration was merged with the
IRS's Alcohol Tax Unit in 1940, and the new organization, still
known as the Alcohol Tax Unit ("ATU"), remained part of the
IRS.22 The ATU became responsible for enforcing the collection
of tobacco taxes in 1952; it consequently was re-christened the Al-
cohol and Tobacco Tax Division. 3
Even before then, however, the agency's regulatory responsibili-
ties had been expanded markedly by enactment of federal gun con-
trol legislation. Enforcement of the 1934 National Firearm Act fell
under the ATU's aegis. 2 4 That law, passed in response to the gang-
sterism and violence that had erupted during Prohibition, restricted
the sale and possession of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and
similar weapons. Soon after that legislation, the Federal Firearms
Act of 1938 made it a federal crime for convicted felons to procure
or transport firearms in interstate commerce.26
The Gun Control Act of 1968 imposed stricter and more wide-
ranging regulatory controls on the firearms industry.27 Passed in
the wake of the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the law mandated that every manufac-
turer of firearms and every gun dealer obtain a federal license,
18. Yelvington, supra note 15, at 40.
19. See id.
20. See Federal Alcohol Administration Act, ch. 814, 49 Stat. 977 (1935) (current
version at 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219a (1988)); A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. Gov-
ERNMENT 40 (George T. Kurlan ed., 1998).
21. Id. at 40-41.
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id.
24. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26
U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994)).
25. Id.
26. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1.250 (1958) (current version at
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-927 (1994)).
27. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-927).
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keep proper records of transactions, and be subject to periodic in-
spections.2 8 Enforcement responsibility was delegated to the IRS's
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division.29 In addition, the 1968 Gun
Control Act gave the Division jurisdiction over the criminal posses-
sion and use of explosives.3 °
The Division's name was changed to the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms ("ATF") Division of the IRS in 1970. 31 The ATF was ac-
corded independent bureau status within the Treasury Department
in 1972.32
The BATF's gun-control responsibilities were broadened further
by the enactment of the so-called Brady Bill in 1993. 33 The law
established a mandatory five-day waiting period for the purchase
of handguns, and charged local law enforcement officials with the
responsibility of checking the backgrounds of handgun purchasers
prior to delivery.34
As a result of the 1968 Gun Control Act and the Brady Bill,
firearms violations have become the BATF's chief area of law en-
forcement activity.35 Table 1 shows BATF criminal referrals, by
program category, to local, state, and federal prosecutors for fiscal
year 1995 and the first six months of fiscal year 1996.36 Of the
agency's 9,583 referrals in 1995, for example, 8,612 (nearly ninety
percent) of them involved firearms violations.37
Like any other government agency, the BATF has seen its
budget grow as its regulatory responsibilities have increased. 38 To-
tal BATF expenditures were nearly $129 million in 1978;39 that fig-
ure increased to $409 million in 1995.40 Expressed in constant
28. Id.




33. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)).
34. Id.
35. See infra App., Tbl. 1.
36. Infra App., Tbl. 1.
37. Infra App., Tbl. 1.
38. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 803 (1996); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS-BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEARS 1975-2002, avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/budgetsummary/btd/1975_2002/btdOlbatf.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2003).
39. U.S. DEFP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38.
40. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 38, at 803.
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1982-84 dollars, spending climbed by almost thirty-five percent
(from $197.5 million to $265.7 million) over this period.
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
It is no secret that the BATF has been criticized harshly by de-
fenders of the Second Amendment. 41 Acknowledging past
problems, the agency implemented a strategic plan in the mid
1990s in an attempt to regain the public's confidence.42 The plan's
purpose was to provide guidance in setting priorities, allocating re-
sources, and evaluating performance.43
Numerous stories about the mistreatment of law-abiding citizens
by overzealous agents abound, despite this public relations effort.44
The National Rifle Association, one of the agency's most caustic
censors, ran full-page advertisements in the Washington Post and
USA Today on March 1, 1995, pointing to the BATF's "tyrannical
record of misconduct and abuse of power" and "contempt for civil
rights. '45 The ads drew a quick response from Treasury Undersec-
retary Ronald Noble, who claimed that:
[W]hile the NRA spends lavishly on ads to fight the ATF, ATF
agents put their lives on the line to fight crime.... Rather than
casting about for villains, the NRA should join the American
public.., in recognizing and praising the men and women who
risk their lives to protect public safety.46
Then-United States Congressman Charles Schumer (D-NY)
echoed these sentiments in an open letter to the NRA: "Your ad
does not cite a single specific example, nor a single documented
source, to support the overblown evils attributed to [the] ATF....
Your ad is not about truth. It is about the extremism of those who
control the NRA. 47
41. See Letter from Ronald K. Noble, Under Secretary, Department of the Trea-
sury, to Tanya K. Metaska, Executive Director, National Rifle Association of
America (Mar. 3, 1995), available at http://elfie.org/-croaker/treasury.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2003); Letter from Charles Schumer, Congressman, House of Represent-
atives, to Tanya K. Metaska, Executive Director, National Rifle Association of
America (Mar. 2, 1995), available at http://elfie.org/-croaker/shumer.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2003).
42. KOPEL & BLACKMAN, supra note 2, at 307-10.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., id. at 308.
45. Letter from Ronald K. Noble to Tanya K. Metaska, supra note 41.
46. Id.
47. Letter from Charles Schumer to Tanya K. Metaska, supra note 41.
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In what follows, this Study explores this controversy in some de-
tail. Using 1995 data on criminal referrals, the Study finds evi-
dence that lends support to the charges of the BATF's critics.
Information relating to the BATF's activities over the years 1992
through 1995 is collected and maintained by the Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC") at Syracuse Univer-
sity.48 Federal court districts are the units of observation for the
data. The information covers all criminal matters referred by the
bureau's agents to U.S. Attorneys nationwide. Excluding Guam,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands,
there are ninety such geographical court districts.49 For twenty-six
states plus the District of Columbia, the jurisdiction of the federal
court is coextensive with the state's boundaries. 50 The remaining
twenty-four states house more than one federal court district. 1 In
these multi-district states, the district-level data aggregates into
state-level observations by simple summation, or, where appropri-
ate, by constructing weighted averages.
The goal of this Study is to explain variations in the BATF's re-
ferrals of criminal cases across the fifty states and the District of
Columbia. There is considerable disparity in such activities nation-
wide. 2 Based on comparisons of criminal referrals per capita,
David Burnham, TRAC's co-director, suggested that the BATF has
allocated more of its law enforcement resources to rural areas than
to large cities where illegal guns arguably are a much greater prob-
lem.53 The raw data strongly support this conclusion. On a per
capita basis, the largest number of criminal referrals originated in
the State of Montana during 1995 (127 cases for a population of
870,000). 54 Western North Carolina had two hundred referrals out
of a population of 2.2 million people, and Northern Florida had 128
cases for 1.4 million people that same year.55 By way of contrast, in
1995 there were 113 BATF referrals out of a population of nearly
48. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse University [hereinafter
TRAC], at http://trac.syr.edu (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
49. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-133 (2000) (laying out the United States geographical
court districts).
50. See id. § 133.
51. See id.
52. TRAC, supra note 48, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracatf/findings/aboutATF/atfRe-
gionalVar.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
53. Karen Gullo, ATF More Active in Small Towns, TIMES DAILY (Florence, Ala.),
Sept. 8, 1996, at 4A.
54. TRAC, supra note 48, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracatf/findings/95/criminal/refR95.
html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
55. Gullo, supra note 53, at 4A.
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sixteen million in the Central District of California, including Los
Angeles; Northern Illinois, including Chicago, had ninety-eight
cases referred out of eight million people; and the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, which includes Manhattan, had 172 referrals for
a population base of over four million.
The BATF denies that it pursues crime in small towns more vig-
orously than in big cities, and offers two explanations for the ap-
parent geographic disparity in referral activity.57 First, "local law
enforcement agencies often find themselves under-manned, and
rely on a federal agency like the ATF to investigate crimes. '58 Sec-
ond, "federal gun laws are often stricter than state laws, particu-
larly in some states in the West."' 59 The BATF accordingly makes
more referrals for prosecution in these states, particularly some of
those which are located in the (rural) West, under stricter federal
laws.6 °
These propositions are testable. The Study's empirical analysis
proceeds as follows: the Study first estimates a linear regression
equation designed to explain cross-state variations in violent crime
rates. The Study then reports regression results for criminal refer-
rals, and, to further explore the harassment hypothesis, for prose-
cutions declined.
A. Violent Crime
The roles played by gun ownership and gun laws in the produc-
tion function of violent crime are topics of contentious debate.61
Lott and Lott and Mustard, for example, evoked impassioned reac-
tions by reporting evidence that, other things equal, violent crime
rates are lower in states where private citizens easily can secure
licenses permitting them to carry concealed weapons. 62 The au-
thors reasoned that when criminals are uncertain whether potential
victims are armed, they rationally commit fewer assaults, substitut-
ing instead into crimes against property or other illegal activities
56. Id.; see TRAC, supra note 48, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracatf/findings/95/criminal/
refR95.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).




61. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Peril or Protection? The Risks and Benefits of Hand-
gun Prohibition, 12 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 285, 287-323 (1993) (pointing out vari-
ous arguments and constitutional issues involved in the debate over handgun
prohibition).
62. LoTT, supra note 10, at 94-96; Lott & Mustard, supra note 10, at 64.
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where the probability of confronting a potentially armed victim is
less.63 In what follows, this result is reproduced on a different data
set. Indeed, the evidence from this Study suggests that concealed-
carry laws are the only gun control provisions with a statistically
significant crime-deterring effect. Moreover, the Study found that
crime rates are lower in states having relatively more law-abiding
gun owners.
The Study's findings with respect to violent crimes-murder,
rape, and (armed) robbery, by and large-are based on estimates
of the following linear regression equation for 199564:
VICRIME = a0 + a1NRAMEMBERS + a2POLICEXP +
a3INVESTIGATE + a4POVERTY + a5UNEMPLOYMENT +
a6PPURCHASE + a7PCARRY + a9WAIT + at0CCARRY
+a1 lDC.
Variable definitions, descriptive statistics, and data sources are
presented in Table 2.
Violent crime rates are hypothesized to depend on the number
of responsible gun owners in a state (NRAMEMBERS), local and
state government expenditures for police protection services
(POLICEXP), the number of BATF agents available to investigate
possible criminal violations (INVESTIGATE), demographic vari-
ables (POVERTY and UNEMPLOYMENT),65 and the restrictive-
ness of state gun laws (PPURCHASE, PCARRY, WAIT, and
CCARRY). DC is a binary variable denoting the District of Co-
lumbia, which is known as a high-crime area, and is also the only
jurisdiction in the nation to ban the sale of handguns.
NRAMEMBERS serves as a proxy for the number of law-abid-
ing gun owners in a state, and is expected to be negatively related
to violent crime rates. This relationship will hold if the members of
the National Rifle Association are more responsible than the aver-
age citizen in the handling of firearms. Alternatively, criminals
may be more hesitant to commit violent crimes in states where
greater proportions of the citizenry belong to the NRA, and hence,
63. Lo-rr, supra note 10, at 114-15; Lott & Mustard, supra note 10, at 64.
64. Data availability issues restrict the empirical analysis to 1995. That is the only
year for which information was obtainable on the number of NRA members by state.
65. In addition to these two demographic variables, the Study also estimated re-
gressions including the fraction of the population between the ages of five and thirty-
four, and the percentage of persons living in urban areas. Neither of these variables
proved statistically significant either when entered by themselves, or in specifications
including POVERTY or UNEMPLOYMENT.
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are more likely to possess firearms with which to defend
themselves.66
There are two possibilities with respect to the availability of law
enforcement resources. One possibility is that more BATF investi-
gators and more local and state spending on police protection deter
crime. The other possibility is that both states and the BATF tend
to allocate more resources to law enforcement in jurisdictions
where there is more criminal activity. The algebraic signs on
POLICEXP and INVESTIGATE will depend on which direction
of causality dominates.
POVERTY and UNEMPLOYMENT are entered as socioeco-
nomic determinants of crime. More individuals are likely to
choose criminal occupations in states where the opportunity cost
(in terms of foregone income) is lower. The estimated coefficients
on these variables, therefore, is expected to be positive in sign.
Four dummy variables, PPURCHASE, PCARRY, WAIT, and
CCARRY, control for the stringency of a state's gun laws. The first
three of these variables represent regulations that increase the cost
of obtaining and using handguns (virtually no state regulates the
ownership of rifles). The estimated coefficients on these variables
are expected to be negative to the extent that licensing require-
ments and waiting periods make it more difficult for criminals to
obtain the weapons they use in committing violent crimes.
CCARRY, on the other hand, tests whether "shall issue" laws al-
lowing private citizens to carry concealed weapons deter or en-
courage violent crime. Deterrence will dominate if uncertainty
makes criminals hesitant to assault (potentially) armed victims. It
has alternatively been argued that the carrying of concealed weap-
ons triggers violence as armed citizens use deadly force to defend
themselves.67
66. NRA members may, in other words, confer a positive externality on their
neighbors. Such a possibility is supported by evidence that widespread firearms own-
ership in the United States is consistent with the significantly lower number of so-
called "hot burglaries" (residents are at home when the criminals strike) committed in
the United States, compared with countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom,
whose laws severely limit private gun ownership. See DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMU-
RAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE CowBoY 418 (1992).
67. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook, The Role of Firearms in Violent Crime, in CRIMINAL
VIOLENCE 236 (Marvin E. Wolfgang & Neil A. Werner eds., 1982); Philip J. Cook,
The Technology of Personal Violence, 14 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV. RES. 1, 57 (1991);
Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 61-
65 (1995); Franklin Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 721,721-25 (1968). See also H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 95
(1996). "More handguns lawfully in civilian hands will not reduce deaths from bullets
and cannot stop the predators from enforcing their criminal demands and expressing
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No a priori prediction is made about the sign of DC. Its coeffi-
cient will depend on whether the District of Columbia in fact ex-
periences more violent crime than the nation as a whole, on the
average, ceteris paribus.
The regression results, using Halbert White's procedure for ob-
taining heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and co-vari-
ances,68 are reported in Table 3. The three specifications
essentially tell the same story. Violent crime rates are significantly
lower in states where more citizens belong to the NRA. They are
higher where local and state governments allocate more resources
to police protection services and where the BATF assigns more
agents to criminal investigation duties. These results do not imply
that more police protection expenditures and federal agents cause
more violent crime. Causality undoubtedly flows in the opposite
direction.
The results also suggest that crime rates are higher in states
where there is more poverty and unemployment. 69 None of the
three dummy variables controlling for the stringency of state gun
laws is statistically significant, though. Neither requiring individu-
als to obtain licenses to purchase or carry handguns, nor compel-
ling individuals to wait prior to taking possession of handguns has
apparent value in deterring violent crime.70 But concealed-carry
laws indeed have such an effect; other things being equal, crime
rates are significantly lower in those states that permit gun owners
to carry weapons concealed about their persons, suggesting that
criminals are intimidated by the possibility that their victims are
armed. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, violent crime rates are
significantly lower in the District of Columbia than elsewhere,
when other factors are held constant.
Overall, the regressions explain between eighty and ninety per-
cent of the variation in violent crime rates across the states. With
these results as background, we now turn to an examination of the
BATF's criminal referral activities.
their lethal purposes with the most effective tool they can get their hands on." Id.
Private gun ownership, in other words, kindles an arms race that law-abiding civilians
cannot hope to win. See id. For a listing of these dummy variables, see App.
68. Halbert White, A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator
and a Direct Test for Heteroscedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817, 821-27 (1980).
69. When both of these variables are entered in the same regression, their esti-
mated coefficients remain positive, but only POVERTY is different from zero at stan-
dard levels of statistical significance.
70. The insignificance of WAIT may be due to the Brady Bill's preemption of state
gun laws.
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B. Criminal Referrals
A key indicator of the BATF's law enforcement activities is the
number of cases it refers for prosecution to local U.S. Attorneys.
Referrals are not a perfect measure of the extent to which federal
agents ferret out law violations because, to quote BATF assistant
director Patrick Hynes, "one referral could have 10 defendants."'"
The violations charged are not of equal import in every referral,
either. This is a common problem with law enforcement statistics.
One antitrust case, for example, can represent a minor infraction
committed by a single small firm, or a major criminal price-fixing
conspiracy involving multiple defendants. But so long as referrals
are positively correlated with the underlying, "true" measure of
BATF activity, their determinants will also be positively correlated.
This Study hypothesizes that cross-state variations in BATF re-
ferrals are explained by variations in violent crime rates, NRA
memberships, BATF and local law enforcement resource availabili-
ties, and state gun laws. These considerations lead to the following
linear regression specification:
REFERRALS = 130 + 13VICRIME + P2NRAMEMBERS + 33 +
P4POLICEXP + P35PPURCHASE + 36PCARRY + P37WAIT +
38CCARRY.
As explained in Table 2, REFERRALS is the total number of
BATF referrals in a state per 100,000 population; all other variables
are defined as before.
VICRIME is included to test whether, given the apparent rural-
urban disparity in BATF law enforcement activity, the agency, in
fact, allocates its resources in a way that shortchanges high-crime,
big-city jurisdictions. A negative sign on VICRIME is expected if
this perverse resource-allocation theory holds. If, on the other
hand, the BATF allocates more resources to states where violent
crime rates are higher, VICRIME will be positively correlated with
REFERRALS.
The harassment hypothesis is explored by including NRA mem-
bership as a possible determinant of BATF referrals. With violent
crime rates held constant, there is no reason to expect referral ac-
tivity to be significantly related to NRAMEMBERS a priori unless,
as asserted by the agency's critics, federal agents tend to harass
responsible gun owners by charging them with minor, "technical"
law violations. This interpretation is reinforced by the evidence re-
ported above that, other things being equal, violent crime rates are
71. Gullo, supra note 53, at 4A.
CRIME, GUN CONTROL & BATF
lower in those states where more citizens belong to the National
Rifle Association. Hence, a positive sign on NRAMEMBERS is
consistent with a law enforcement strategy in which the BATF ha-
rasses the members of an interest group that oppose restrictions on
gun ownership and, pari passu, the agents who enforce them.72
More criminal referrals are expected in those states where there
are more BATF investigators assigned to ferret out law violations.
Fewer referrals are expected where local and state governments
spend more on police protection if, as the agency asserts, its agents
commonly pursue investigations that would strain the resources of
under-manned local law enforcement agencies. Finally, the four
gun law dummy variables (PPURCHASE, PCARRY, WAIT, and
CCARRY) are included to test the BATF's contention that its wor-
kload is greater in states with weak firearms regulations.
Table 4 reports the regression results. Two versions of the RE-
FERRALS equation are estimated by ordinary least squares. The
Study also estimates, by two-stage least squares, a third regression
specification where both REFERRALS and VICRIME are treated
as being determined endogenously.73
The coefficient estimates show a positive and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between BATF referrals and violent crime. An
urban-rural "bias" in the bureau's law enforcement priorities is not
apparent when other factors explaining BATF referral activity are
held constant. The estimates also provide evidence that the
BATF's investigators have positive marginal products-there are
more criminal referrals in states where there are more agents in
place-and that federal agents do, in fact, serve as substitutes for
undermanned local police forces (the estimated coefficient on
72. A positive coefficient on NRAMEMBERS is also consistent with bureaucratic
incentives to produce "visible" output easily observed by the agency's oversight com-
mittees in Congress. Cotton M. Lindsay, A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84 J.
POL. ECON. 1061, 1065 (1976). The BATF can justify requests for more generous
operating budgets by pursuing large numbers of minor gun-law violations, rather than
devoting its resources to fewer "big" cases. The bureau simply selects easy targets to
appear busy and can do so in states where the membership of the NRA is relatively
large, gun ownership is more widespread and, hence, BATF agents are afforded more
opportunities for uncovering "technical" violations of the law. Although the analysis
does not distinguish between these two explanations, given the acrimonious relations
between the NRA and the BATF, the harassment hypothesis seems more plausible.
73. Strictly speaking, two-stage least squares ("TSLS") are not necessary in this
case. On the basis of the simple correlation coefficient between the residuals of the
regression results reported in the second columns of Tables 2 and 3 (r2 = -. 104), the
system is recursive, and so the two equations can be estimated separately without
introducing simultaneous-equations bias.
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POLICEXP is negative and significant at the one percent level in
all three specifications).
More importantly, other things (including violent crime rates)
being equal, criminal referrals are significantly more frequent in
those states with larger NRA memberships. Moreover, none of the
estimated coefficients on the gun law variables come anywhere
close to reaching standard levels of statistical significance. These
results dispute the BATF's contention that it has more work to do
in states whose gun laws are more liberal than federal laws. They
support the hypothesis that the agency's law enforcement philoso-
phy includes special attention for NRA members-a finding that is
bolstered by some additional evidence reported below.
C. Prosecutions Declined
As a final test of the hypothesis that the BATF engages in the
harassment of responsible gun owners, the Study estimated a re-
gression equation designed to explain cross-state variations in the
number of criminal matters referred to U.S. Attorneys that the at-
torneys decline to prosecute. The Authors' conjecture is that U.S.
Attorneys decline to prosecute cases referred to them by BATF
agents when the evidence of criminal activity is weak or the viola-
tion charged is so minor that the cost of prosecution is less than the
expected benefit of obtaining a conviction.
The dependent variable in our regression specification is DE-
CLINED, the number of referrals with prosecution declined in a
state per 100,000 population.74 One new independent variable, the
weighted average number of days before a decision to decline to
prosecute is reached, TBEFDECLINE is included on the theory
that for bureaucratic reasons U.S. Attorneys are less likely to de-
cline to prosecute a case referred to them the more time they in-
vest in evaluating its merits.
The OLS regression results for this estimation are reported be-
low (absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses):76
74. The mean of the dependent variable is 1.29, with a standard deviation of .83.
75. In those states encompassing more than one federal court district,
TBEFDECLINE is the weighted average of the mean number of days elapsing before
a decision to decline prosecution is reached, where the weights are the total number
of referrals for prosecution in each district. TBEFDECLINE is the simple state aver-
age otherwise. The mean of this variable is 379.88 days, with a standard deviation of
154.57 days.
76. t indicates significance at the five percent level of statistical confidence; f indi-
cates significance at the ten percent level.
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DECLINED = 1.5613 +.007VICRIME + .004NRAMEMBERS
(1.36) (1.99)f
-. O034POLICEXP +.0905INVESTIGATE(2.11)t (1.61)
-. 0011TBEFDECLINE
(1.73)t
(R2 = .208; F = 2.36T).7
7
As expected, U.S. Attorneys decline to prosecute fewer numbers
of cases referred to them as greater time elapses before such a de-
cision is reached. Just as the BATF makes fewer criminal referrals
in jurisdictions where local and state governments spend more on
police protection services, prosecution is declined in fewer of the
cases where local police forces have more resources, and, hence,
tend to rely less on federal agents to conduct investigations. In
addition, there is some evidence that greater numbers of weak
cases are referred for prosecution in states where more BATF in-
vestigators have been assigned, perhaps indicating that flimsy
charges are more likely to be brought in districts where more fed-
eral agents compete with one another to show productivity results
to their superiors. The estimated coefficient on INVESTIGATE
just misses being significant at the ten percent level, and not much
should be read into this result.
Finally, and consistent with the harassment hypothesis, more re-
ferrals for prosecution are declined, ceteris paribus, in states having
more NRA members. Taken together with earlier findings sug-
gesting that BATF agents refer more cases for criminal prosecution
to U.S. Attorneys in such states-despite the fact that violent
crime rates are lower in states with large NRA memberships-the
conclusion that federal agents harass responsible gun owners is al-
most inescapable.
CONCLUSION
This Study reports evidence that the law enforcement activities
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms are influenced by
both public-spirited and bureaucratic motives. While the BATF
makes more referrals for criminal prosecution to U.S. Attorneys in
states where there is more violent crime and where local and state
law enforcement agencies have fewer resources to combat it, evi-
dence is also found that the BATF harasses law-abiding gun own-
ers. In particular, more criminal referrals are made in states where
the National Rifle Association enrolls relatively large numbers of
77. Similar results (not reported here) are obtained using two-stage least squares.
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members, even though violent crime rates are significantly lower in
those states. Evidence that the BATF engages in harassment is re-
inforced by the finding that, other things being equal, U.S. Attor-
neys tend to decline to prosecute more of the cases referred to
them in states having more NRA members. Finally, the analysis
provides no support for the arguments that strict gun control laws
deter violent crime or that the licensing of private citizens to carry
concealed weapons encourages it. Indeed, violent crime rates are
significantly lower in those states that allow private citizens to
carry concealed weapons, all else equal.
While abuses of the BATF and other law enforcement agencies
often produce sensational headlines, scholars seem reluctant to at-
tribute private-interest motives to the policing and judicial institu-
tions of government. This tendency to treat the forces of law and
order as being somehow above the fray of ordinary politics is par-
ticularly noteworthy in the area of antitrust, where public-interest
models of bureaucratic behavior hold sway, despite the accumula-
tion of an empirical literature suggesting that these laws are driven
by less laudable ideals. 78 The evidence presented in this Study con-
tributes to a rethinking of the public-interest paradigm. To be sure,
the BATF allocates more of its resources to high-crime states and
helps fill some of the law enforcement gaps left open by un-
derfunded local police forces. At the same time, however, the bu-
reau apparently targets responsible gun owners, perhaps because
these individuals are often the BATF's most vocal critics. Mea-
sured both in terms of the lives lost in places like Ruby Ridge,
Idaho, and the violent crimes that go undeterred while the agency
harasses law-abiding citizens, the opportunity cost of such a law
enforcement strategy can be quite high.
78. FRED S. MCCHESNEY & WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, THE CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 231-42 (1995); WILLIAM
F. SHUOGHART II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS 36-51 (1990).
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BATF REFERRALS BY PRO GRAM AREA








aFirst six months of fiscal year.
Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse University, at http://
trac.syr.edu (last visited Jan. 15, 2003.)
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1. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse, New York, at http://
trac.syr.edu/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2003)
2. ALMANAC OF THE 50 STATES: BASIC DATA WITH COMPRATIVE TABLES 436
(Edith R. Hornor ed., 1996).
3. Trasactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 1.
TABLE 2
VARIABLE DEFNITIONS, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Standard
Variable Definition Mean DvationDeviation
Number of BATF referrals
REFERRALS' for prosecution per 100,000 3.29 2.19
population
VICRIME2  Violent crime rate, per 595.69 400.97100,000 persons, 1994
Total BATF criminal
INVESTIGATE3  investigators per 100,000 1.15 3.49
population
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State and local government
POLICEXP4  police expenditures, per $291.86 $165.03
capita, 1992
NRAMEMBERS 5  NRA members per 100,000population 1,455.18 692.74
POVERTY6  Percent of persons below 13.23 4.05poverty level, 1994 (percent)
UNEMPLOYMENT7  State unemployment rate 5.26 1.28(percent)
Binary variable indicating
PPURCHASE8  states that require a permit .24 .43
to purchase a handgun
Binary variable indicating
PCARRY9  states that require a permit .55 .50
to carry a handgun
Binary variable indicating
WAIT"O states that impose a waiting .43 .50period prior to purchasing a
handgun
Binary variable indicating
CCARRY1" states that permit the .61 .49carrying of concealed
weapons
Note: All data are for 1995 unless otherwise indicated.
4. United States Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 1995, 201 (1995).
5. Personal Correspondence from the National Rifle Association, to Jim F.
Couch (on file with author).
6. United States Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 1996, 397 (1996).
7. Id. at 474.
8. National Rifle Association, Index of Gun Laws, available at http://www.nra.




FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VICRIME)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 268.9952 -324.3114 68.9145
-. 1506 -. 0937 -. 1434
NRAMEMBERS (3 .80)tt (3.05)" 1  (3.8 7)"t
POLICEXP 1.5439 1.6807 1.3367(5.28 )tt (7 .10)tt (4.2 3)tt
228.6481 188.0786 226.6453INVESTIGATE (2.5 8)t (4 .7 9)tt ( 3.0 0)tt
PO VERTY 34.7299(6.7 7)tt
UNEMPLO YMENT 50.0672(2 .00)1
-55.9588 9.1825 -24.5194(.69) (.16) (.28)
31.1609 22.7249 -2.4950(.52) (.50) (.04)
3.6342 40.7145 18.1501(.05) (.73) (.26)
-113.3515 -82.3374 -124.9448
CCARRY (1.82)* (1..69)1 (2.17) 1
-5296.163 -4685.267 -5250.467
DC (2.4 6)t (4 .7 5)tt (2.89)tt
R 2  .796 .891 .811
F-statistic 20 .47 tt 37.17 t t  19.58ft
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.
See Table 2 for variable definitions.
ftSignificant at the one percent level.
tSignificant at the five percent level.
4Significant at the ten percent level.
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TABLE 4
REGoRpSSION RESULTS (DEPENDENT VARLABLE: REFERRALS)
Independent (1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS OLS TSLSa
Intercept 2.0265 2.2882 1.8122
VICRIME .0026 .0028 .0040V1CR1ME (1.88)* (1.93)* (2.03) t
NRAMEMBERS .0017 .0015 .0017NRAMEMBERS (3.3 8)"t (2.82)" (2 .93 )tt
INVESTIGATE .2499 .2911 .2693
INVESTIGATE (1.69)1 (1.87)1 (1.70)'
POLICEXP -. 0103 -. 0113 -.0131POLICEXP (2.85)"t (2.91)tt (2.98)t"
PPURCHASE .0908 .1671(.12) (.21)
PCARRY .2063 .1481(.32) (.23)
WAIT -. 8261 -. 8408(1.28) (1.29)
CCARRY .5455 .6451(.84) (.96)
R2  .242 .280 .268
F-statistic 3.66t 2.04t 2.06*
aThe instrumental variales are NRAMEMBERS, INVESTIGATE,
PPURCHASE, PCARRY, WAIT, CCARRY, POVERTY, AND DC.
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.
See Table 2 for variable definitions.
ttSignificant at the one percent level.
tSignificant at the five percent level.
tSignificant at the ten percent level.
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